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THE POLICE POWER AND THE NEW YORK

EMERGENCY RENT LAWS.

"This case stands or falls on police power," said Judge
Hough, in pronouncing upon the constitutionality of the
so-called "Emergency Rent Laws" of New York, enacted
in April and September, 1920.1 ' Definition of this phrase,"
he added, "has never advanced over Chief Justice Taney's
declaration that it is no more than the power inherent in a
sovereign. License Cases, 5 How., .at page 583. Applied
to a State, this means its reserved sovereignty, inherent and
incapable of being bartered away, because necessary for the
State's existence, and lessened only by what the people.
of the State joined with all the other people of the other
States in conveying to and consolidating in the United
•States."
An objection, perhaps the most serious objection,
made to the adoption of the new Federal Constitution in
11787, was that it contained no bill of rights. The men of
that day had lived under, and for years fought against, the
abuse of governmental powers. •Those abuses had led to
the Declaration of Indbpendence, the Revolution, and the
establishment of a new nation. The government of. the
*Confederation had proved to be too weak. If the Union
were to endure, grcater powers must be conferred upon the
I Marcus Brown

Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 3o6, 36.
(301)
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federated government. Thus much was conceded. But
many men, while willing to erect a stronger national government felt it to be vital that its constitution should contain
adequate provisions for the protection of individual rights
against the powers of government. They were unwilling
to trust anyone-even the chosen representatives of the
people-with unrestrained authority over the life, liberty
or property of the citizen. "Wherever the real power in a
government lies," wrote Madison, "there is the danger of
oppression." That danger, they insisted, must be guarded
against in the adoption of a bill of rights.
The defenders of the proposed constitution answered
by pointing out that the new government would have only
the powers expressly enumerated in the constitution, and
those "necessary and proper" for carrying them into execution, and that in such a government no bill of rights is neces-.
sary, because the people have not parted with their powers.
"A bill of rights annexed to a constitution," argued James.
Wilson, "is an enumeration of powers reserved. If we attempt an enumeration, everything that is not enumerated
is presumed to be given. "s
Hamilton advanced a similar contention. Declarations of rights, such as were demanded, he said, "must be
intended as limitations of the power of the government itself." He pointed out that not only were such limitations
unnecessary to a government of enumerated powers, but
that they would be dangerous, because of possible omissions,
and the difficulty of accurately defining the limitations.*
While the Constitution was adopted, as submitted, bythe requisite number of States, yet it was only upon thepromise of its friends that as soon. as the new government
was established, a suitable bill of rights should be framed
and submitted for adoption as an. amendnient to the Constitution. Accordingly, at the first session of the Congress,
held in 1789, resolutions were adopted reciting that: "The
s2 Elliott's Debates, 453-459.
3 Federalist, LXXXIV.
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Conventions of a number of the States having at the time of
their adopting the Constitution expressed a desire, in order
to prevent misconstruction or abuse of its powers, that
further declaratory and restrictive clauses should be added;
and as extending the ground of public confidence, in the
government will best insure the beneficent ends of its institution," therefore, there was proposed to the legislatures
of the several States twelve amendments,4 ten of which were
ratified by the requisite number of States, and -became a
part of the Constitution before I791.5 These amendments
were intended as limitations upon, and in express language
they did qualify and limit, the powers of the national government in certain specified particulars.
The Fifth Amendment embodied, in the classic language
of Magna Charta, a declaration of the rights which the
people of that day held most sacred:
"No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other;
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a
.grand jury, . .;nor shall any person be subject for - the
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall
be compelled, in any criminal case, to be a witness against himself;
nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall .private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation."
Finally to remove any ground for misapprehension
that the new government was to be one of enumerated
powers, it was declared in Article X,
"The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively or to the people."
The provisions of the first nine Amendments early
were declared by the Supreme Court to be limitations upon"
the powers of the Federal Government, not of the States.*
They were intended to make certain that the powers of the
new government should be exercised subject to the restrictions specifically imposed by the Amendments. Certain
i 1 Stats. at L., 97.
'Id. 21.
'Barron v. Mayor, 7 Pet. 243.
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limitations upon State powers were embodied in the Constitution itself, either inferentially, by the grant of enumerated
powers, such as the regulation of commerce among the
States, and with foreign nations, or explicitly, as in Section
ioof Article I.
Chief Justice Taney, in the License Cases, 7 emphasized
that unless necessarily excluded by the grant of power in
the Constitution to the Federal Government, the powers
of the States remained unimpaired. It was decided in that
case that a State may, in the execution of its police and
health laws, make regulations of commerce, "but which
Congress may control."

It was in this connection that the

Chief Justice used the language concerning the police power
referred to by Judge Hough in the New York Rent Cases,
viz.:

"But what are the police powers of the State? They are
nothing more or less than the powers of government inherent in
every sovereignty to the extent of its dominions. And whether a
State passes a quarantine law, or a law to punish offenses, or to
establish courts of justice, or requiring certain instruments- to be
recorded, or to regulate commerce within its own limits, in every
case it exercises the same power; that is to say, the power of
sovereignty, the power to govern men and things within the limits
of its dominion. It is by virtue of this power that it legislates;
and its authority to make regulations of commerce is as absolute
as its power to pass health laws, except insofar as it has been restricted by the Constitution of the United States."

This amounts to saying that the States remain possessed
of all their powers which are not taken, from them by the
Constitution of the United States. Nothing in the passage
sanctions the doctrine that the powers expressly conferred
upon the national government, or the restrictions upon
either national or state power in the Constitution, are subject to an undefined reserved power in the States to legislate
at will "in aid of what is sanctioned by usdge, or held by
-the prevailing -moralityor strong and preponderant opinion
to be greatly and immediately necessary to the public welfare."'
7.5
How. 572, at p. 583.
sper Iloines, J., Oklahoma Bank Guaranty Cases, 219 U. S., .1o4, 1i1.
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By section io of Article I of the Constitution, it was
among other things, declared that -"no State shall * * *
pass any
* * * law impairing the obligation of contracts

*

*

*

,

The law of the State of New Hampshire in effect repealing the charter of Dartmouth College, which the Supreme
Court held void as against this prohibition in the Dartmouth
College Case,$ was not saved as a valid exercise of the police
power. Mr. Justice Story thus summed up that decision:
"In my judgment, it is perfectly clear that any act of a legislature which takes away any powers or franchise vested by its
charter in a private corporation or its corporate officers, or which
restrains or controls the legitimate exercise of them, or transfers
them to other persons, without its assent, is a violation of the
obligations of that charter. If the legislature mean to claim such
an authority,.itmust be reserved in the grant."to

The broad proposition asserted by Mr. Justice Barbour
in City of New York v. Miln," "that all those powers which
relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps,
more properly be called internalpolice," were not surrendered
by the States to the Federal Government, "and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority of a State is
complete, unqualified, and exclusive,"" was vigorously
'combatted by Mr. Justice Story in a dissenting opinion
which, he stated, represented also the views of Chief Justice
Marshall then but recently deceased. The reasoning of the
majority opinion, he wrote, would brush aside all possible
limitations upon the exercise by the State of the power to
legislate respecting any matter which in the opinion of the
legislature "concerned the welfare of the whole people of a
State, or any individual within it."
The discussion of the Justices in the Passenger Cases,"
resulting in the failure of a majority to agree in the reasons
for holding a State law imposing a tax upon all alien passengers arriving at the ports of the State, to be in effect a regula*41Wheat. 5t8.
1 t o,2 159.
Id. at p. 139.
1 7 How. 283.
U
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tion of commerce, and therefore an invasion of the Congressional control over that subject, served to demonstrate
the impossibility of giving to the State police, power the
scope claimed for it in the
iln Case, without impairing
the supremacy of the national government in the domain
expressly conceded to it by the Constitution.
"The police power of the State," wrote Justice McLean,
"cannot draw within its jurisdiction objects which lie beyond it.
It meets the commercial power of the Union in dealing with subjects under the protection of that power, yet it can only be exerted
under peculiar emergencies, and to a limited extent. In guarding
the safety, the health, and morals of its citizens, a State is restricted

to appropriate and constitutional means."'&
Mr. Justice Wayne qualified and limited the effect of
the decision in the Miln Case. In his opinion, the police or
sovereign of the States had been reserved only so far as

necessary to their internal government.'"
In the New Orleans Gas Case,- while conceding
"that there is a power, sometimes called the police power, which
has never been surrendered by the States, in virtue of which they
may, within certain limits, control everything within their respective territories, and upon the proper exercise of which, under
some circumstances, may depend the public health, the public
morals, or the public safety,"

the Court declared:
"Definitions of the police power must, however, be taken,
subject to the condition that the State cannot, in its exercise, for
any purpose whatever, encroach upon the powers of the general
government, or rights granted or secured by the supreme law of
the land."
But a few years later, in Railroad Co. v. Bristol," in

upholding a State statute compelling -a railroad to remove
certain grade crossings, the Court, speaking by Chief Justice
Fuller, said that it was thoroughly established in the court
"that the inhibitions of the Constitution of the United States
upon the impairment of the obligation of contracts, or the deprivation of property without due process or of the equal protection oE
"47 Hlow., at p. 4o8.
id., at p. 424.
"6N. 0. Gas. Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., Ix5 U. S. 65o,661.
1 15, U. S. 556, 567.
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the laws, by the States, are not violated by the legitimate exercise
of legislative power in securing the public safety, health and
morals. The governmental power of self protection cannot be
contracted away, nor can the exercise of rights granted, nor the
use of property, be withdrawn from the implied liability to governmental regulation in particulars essential to the preservation of
the community from injury."
In a later case," the Court declared that while it had
held that the police power is one which remains constantly
under the control of the legislative authority, "and that a
city council can neither bind itself, not its successors, to
contracts prejudicial to the peace, good order, health or
morals of its inhabitants," yet "it is to cases of this kind that
these rulings have been confined." 1g The inference is that it
was to such cases only that these rulings had been confined.
As remarked above, the first nine amendments to the
Constitution embodied limitations upon the powers of'the
national government. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth and
Fifteenth Amendments, adopted after the close of the Civil
War, were direct limitations upon the States, established
primarily for the protection of the former African slaves and
their desceidants, but also in certain broader aspects forthe protection of all persons within the law. The Fourteenth Amendment forbade a State to "deprive any. person
of life, liberty or property, without due process of law," or
"deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."
The volume of controversies over the application of
these provisions to State legislation has resulted in increasing scope being given by the courts to the definition of the
police power which the States are deemed not to have surrendered in the Constitution, and not to have been restricted
or impaired by the Fourteenth Amendment. Their decisions have tended back to the extreme view taken iii City
of New York v. Miln, supra. Shortly after the adoption
of these amendments, it was held in the Slaughter House
Cases2o that the provision that "'ho State shall make or en11Walla Walla v. Valla Walla Water Co., 172 U. S. I, 15.
"1To the same effect see Atlantic Coast Line v. Golsdboro,
"016 Wall. 36.

232

U. S. 548.
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force any law which shall abrildge the privilege or immunities
of citizens of the United States," did not extend the protection of the Federal power to his rights as a citizen of the
State. It was further held that a statute regulating the
slaughter of cattle for use in New Orleans, under consideration in that case, did not deny to any person the equal
protection of the laws, and it was upheld as a legitimate
exercise of the police power of the State-that power which,
Mr. Justice Miller said, (at page 62),
"is, and must be from its very nature, incapable of any very exact
definition or limitation. Upon it depends the security of social
order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence
in a thickly populated community, the enjoyment of private and
social life, and the beneficial use of property."
In a later case,,1 the Court, speaking by Mr. Justice
Harlan, said:
"The validity of a police regulation, whether established
directly by the State or by some public body acting under its
sanccion, must depend upon the circumstances of each case and
the character of the regulation, whether arbitrary or reasonable
and whether really designed to accomplish a legitimate public
purpose.
"It may be said in a general way," observed Mr. Justice
Holmes in the Oklahoma Bank Guaranty Casesa "that the police
power extends to all the great public needs. It may be put forth
in aid of what is sanctioned by usage, or held by the prevailing
morality, or strong and preponderant opinion, to be greatly and
immediately necessary to the public welfare."
"Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights," said the
Supreme Court in another case, "is not an unrestricted license to
act according to one's own will."U
It has been held that the right to make contracts is embraced
in the conception of liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution, yet, it is declared that freedom of contract is a qualified,
not an absolute right.
"There is no absolute freedom to do as one wills or to contract
as one chooses. The guaranty of liberty does not withdraw from
legislative supervision that wide department of activity which
consists in the making of contracts, or deny to government the
31Railroad Co. v. Drainage Commrs., 200 U. S. 561. 592.
Noble State Bank v. Haskell, 219 U. S. 104, 11i.
"Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U. S. 86, 89. Cited in Reduction Co. v.
Sanitary Works, 109 U. S. 3o6, 324.
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power to prov:de restrictive- safe-guards. Liberty implies the
absence of arbi'trary restraint, not immunity from reasonable
regulations anc prohibitions imposed in the interest of the community. "u
This distinction in a measure was the basis of the decisions, in the cases of Adair v. United States,25 and Coppage
v. Kansas,26 where State statutes restraining the right of
employers to discharge employees because of their membership in a labor union, or to require them to agree not to join
such unions, as a condition to continued employment, were'
held invalid because repugnant to the due process clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.
The line was drawn in the majority opinion in Coppage.
v. Kansas, between regulations in the public interest, where
private rights of liberty and property are incidentally involved, which were said to be permissible exercises of the
reserved police power, and interferences with "the normal
exercise of personal liberty and property rights," which were
held to be the primary objects of the statute under consideration, and not merely incidents to the advancement of the
general welfare, and therefore in contravention of the Constitution. 27
"With regard to the police power," said Mr. Justice
lolmes in the Oklahoma Bank Guaranty Cases, (supra, at
p. 112) "as elsewhere in the law, lines are pricked out by
the gradual approach and contact of decisions on opposing
sides." Chief Justice Shaw remarked in an early case,"7
"It is much easier to perceive and realize the existence and
sources of this power, than to mark its boundaries, or prescribe the limits to its exercise."
True it is that the courts from time to time asseverate
that the State's police power is subject to the limitations
imposed by the Federal Constitution, which "undoubtedly"
forbid "any arbitrarydeprivation of life, liberty, or property,
Railroad Co. v. McGuire, 219 U. S. 549, 567. See also Arizona Employers Liability Cases, 250 U. S. 400.
2o8 U. S. 161.
-6.236U. S. 1.
2 Corn. v, Alger, 7 Cush., 53, 8S.
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and secures equal protection to all under like circumstances
in the enjoyment of their rights;" but on the other hand,
it is declared, that the Fourteenth Amendment "was not
designed to interfere with the power of the State to protect
the lives, liberties and property of its citizens, and to promote their health, peace, morals, education and good order."23
In every case, therefore, the courts must inquire "whether
the legislature has adopted the statute in exercise of a reasonable discretion, or whether its action be a mere excuse for
an unjust discrinminalion,.or the oppression, or spoilation of
a particular class.""
Thus, the action of the court in each case laigely becomes a matter of personal equation, for what may appear
to one mind to be quite- reasonable, to another will seem
oppressive and discriminatory.
From the decision in 1876 in the Grain Elevator Cases"c
to the Blue Sky Law Cases 31 increasing scope has been given
by the Supreme Court to the exercise by the States under
the police power, of control over the activities, the property
and the business of individuals. Much of this legislation
has been sustained on the theory that the legislature, in the
exercise of its constitutional authority, has clothed with a
public interest the particular property or business affected,
and hence brought it within the area of its reserved sovereign
powers. The application of this theory has so widened
in recent years, that, as Judge Hough said in the New York
Emergency Rent Cases,"
"it may be and has been -asserted that any business is affected
with a public interest as soon as the electoratebecomesufficiently
interested in it -to pass a regulatory statute."
The so-called "Emergency" Rent or Landlord and
Tenant Laws, recently enacted, have served to emphasize
to an unusual, degree the theory of a virtually unrestricted
In re Kemmler, 136 U. S. 436, 448, 449.
IIlolden v. Ilardy, 169 U. S. 366, 398.
See also Budd v. New York, x43 U. S.
20 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113.
517; German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas, 233 U. S. 389; Rast v. Van Deman,
240 U.S.342.

24 2 U. S. 539.
2

Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, 269 Fed. 3o6, 317.
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police power in the States. One of the consequences of the.
late war has been a great shortage of housing facilities in
most of our large cities, due to the diversion of mechanical
industry to war service. The law of supply and demand,
operating in respect of this shortage, naturally caused a
great increase in rents of dwellings of all kinds; just as the
same lav (aided by the War Labor Board) operated to
greatly increase wages of mechanics and artisans. Congress
sought to restrict this increase, in the case of rents of residential properties in the District of Columbia, by declarings"
such property to be "affected with a public interest, and
that all rents * * shall be fair and reasonable"; creiting
a commission clothed with jurisdiction to fix such fair and
reasonable rent and authorizing tenants who were willing
to pay the same, to hold over after the expiration of their
terms. This statute was held unconstitutional by the
District Court of Appeals, and a certiorari to- review the
decision was denied by the United States Supreme Court."4
Plaintiff in that case was held to have a vested estate and
reversion in fee in the property in question, to come into
possession upon the expiration of the lease on January i,
192o. This right of reversion was held to be a property
right of which plaintiff could not be divested, except by due
process of law. The arbitrary fixing of rentals under the
statute was held not to be due process. The renting of
property was declared to be a private business .which could
not be made public, or impressed with a public interest by
legislative fiat. The statute was viewed as in effect taking
private property for private use.
On the other hand, statutes enacted for the same purposes by the legislature of the State of New York, have been
upheld in highest court of the State and in the Federal
(District) Courts. These decisions will shortly come before
the United States Supreme Court for review. The very
large number of cases of threatened evictions of occupants
"3Ball Rent Law, 41 Stats. 298, 300.
"Hirsch v. Block, 267"Fed. 614, 254 U. S.-; 41 Sup. Ct. 13.
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of tenements and apartments in the City of New York and'
the consequent public agitation, led the Governor of theState to appoint a commission to investigate and report
upon the situation and as to remedies. Certain laws were
enacted in April and May, 192o, as a resuit of the condition
shown to the legislature in the Commission's report, and as.
these laws did not bring about the desired relief, a special
session of the legislature was summoned in September of
the same year at which further statutes werepassed. The
purpose of these laws was expressed in one of them's which
recited that
"unjust, unreasonable and oppressive agreements for the payment
of rent having been.and being now exacted by landlords from
tenants under stress of prevailing conditions whereby the freedom
of contract has been impaired and congested housing conditions
resulting therefrom have*seriously affected and endangered thepublic welfare, health and morals in certain cities of the. State,
and a public emergency existing in the judgment of the legislatureby reason thereof,"
therefore it was36 made a defence to any action for rent
accruing under an agreement for premises occupied .for
dwelling purposes (with certain.exceptions), that the rent is
unjust or unreasonable, and that the agreement under which
it is sought to be recovered oppressive. Such an agreement
was37 made presumptiely unjust and unreasonable, if it
appeared that the rent had been increased more than twenty
five per cent over that which existed one year prior to the
time of the proceeding to recover the rent or possession of
the demised premises.
Comprehensively stated, the legislations' enables a
tenant of a dwelling Who fails to pay the agreed rental, or
who holds over and refuses to deliver up possession of the
demised premises when, under the lease, the landlord is.
entitled to possession, to defeat the efforts of the landlord
to oust him, so long as he is willing to pay a rent fixed by35 Laws N. Y. 192o, Chap. 136.

b Chap. 136.
ly
*Iby Chap. 136.
"0Laws 1920, Chaps. 132, 133, 134, 137, 139, 21o.
Session) Chaps. 942, 944, 947.

Laws 1920 (September"
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the court as being ji:. and reasonable. These laws were to
remain in force duri-ig a period of two years from their
enactment.
"A knowledge of preexisting law and the words of the statute,"
says Judge Hough, in the Marcus Brown Holding Co. Case cited
supra, "are enough to prove that the legislative desire is to maintain for about two years the September status of the kind of dwellings in which (by common knowledge) lives the major portion
of the population of the metropolitan" district. This status is to
be maintained against the landlord's will if necessary, but at the
option of the tenants . . yet every such tenant is and will be
as free to depart and choose another landlord as he was before
September, 1920."
*

*i •

*

*

•

*

•

"Speaking now specifically of the facts in the present case,"
the court continued, "the tenant defendants herein, by law older
than the State of New York, became at the landlord's option
trespassers on October I, 1920. Plaintiff had then found and made
a contract with a tenant it liked better, and had done so before'
these statutes were enacted, By them plaintiff is, after defendants
elected to remain in possession, forbidden to carry out his bargain
with the tenant he chose, the obligation of the covenant for peaceable surrender by defendants is impaired, and for the next two
years Feldman, et al., may, if they like, remain in plaintiff's apartment, provided they make good month by month the allegation
of their answer, i. e., pay what 'a court of competent jurisdiction'
regards as fair and reasonable compensation for such enforced use
and occupancy

*

*

*."

This is upheld as a valid exercise of the police power by
the three Federal Judges sitting as a statutory District
Court pursuant to Section .266 of the Judicial Code. Thus
the Court squarely affirms the proposition that despite the
language of the ioth section of Article I of the Constitution
a state legislature may impair the obligation of an existing
contract, or abrogate it, by virtue of its (supposedly) reserved
police power.
While the Court said at page 317 that it-was not necessary to go so far as to assert that "any business is affected .
with a public interest as soon as the electorate became
sufficiently interested in it to pass a regulatory statute,"
yet it did hold "that the business of renting out living space
is quite as suitable for statutory fegulation and as such
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affected with a public interest, as fire insurance,3' and trading stamps."40 That is to say, the business of renting houses
and space in houses for dwelling purposes may be declared
by the legislature to be affected with a public interest, and
regulated-the price or rental fixed by law, and the right
of the tenant to remain in possession be determined by the
legislature, in entire disregard of the landlord, so long as
the tenant shall pay the rent fixed by the court. The constitutionality of these acts also has been upheld by theNew
York Court of Appeals," not only under the State Constitution, which contains the usual due process clauses (Art.
I, Secs. i, 6), but also under the provisions of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Federal Constitution. The grounds of
the decision were somewhat different from those of the
Federal judges. The State court rejected the theory of
clothing the business with a public interest, referring with
apparent approval to the decision of the Court of Appeals
of the District of Columbia in Hirsch v. Block, supra, and
stating:
"The proposition is fundamental that private business may
not be regulated, and may not be converted into public business
by legislative fiat (Producers Trans. Co. v. R. R. Comm., 251 U. S.
228)."

But the Court of Appeals also asserts that the proposition is equally fundamental, that the State may establish
regulations reasonably necessary to secure the general welfare of the community by the exercise of the police power,
although the rights of private property are thereby curtailed and freedom of contract abridged.
"The legislative or police power," said Judge Pound, speaking for all *but two Judges of the Court, "is a dynamic agency,
vague and undefined in its scope, which takes private property
or limits its use when great public needs require, uncontrolled by
the constitutional requirements of due process. Either the rights
of property and.contract must when necessary yield to the public
convenience, advantage and welfare, or it must be found that the
"German Alliance Ins. Co. v. Kansas. 233 I. S. 389.
10Rast v. Van Deman, 240 U. S. 342.
it People ex rel. Durham Realty Co. v. La-Fetra, N. Y. Law Journ., Mar.
15, 1921, page 2021.
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State has surrendered one of the attributes of sovereignty for
which governments are founded and made itself powerless to secure
to its citizens the blessings of freedom and to promote the general
welfare."

This argument is powerful, ad captandum, but the
thought naturally arises thai bills of rights were insisted upon
and embodied in constitutions for the very purpose of restricting the exercise of some of "the attributes of sovereignty" and to protect individual rights and private property
against governmental encroachment for any purpose, even
"'the general welfare." And what becomes of the principle,
recognized as viable by the Court, that "emergency cannot
become the source of power," and that "the Constitution
cannot be suspended in any complication of peace or war,"
if the owner of real property may be deprived of its use,
stripped of his contract rights concerning it, compelled to
accept as compensation for its use and occupation a sum
fixed by the judge of a petty court as "'justand reasonable,".
where many others are clamoring to secure it and are willing
to pay a much higher rent than the existing tenant is willing
(or able) to pay. If this decision beapproved in the Supreme
Court we must frankly recognize that the age of individualism is past and the era of collectivism arrived; that all
rights are held subject to the legislative will, restrained only
by the remnants of judicial power to be asserted where the
encroachment appears to the Court to be obviously unjust,
even to the accomplishment of what is "greatly and insistently demanded" in the name of the public welfare.
But while recognizing the powerful arguments in favor
of the enlarging of the scope of action of this power adjudged
to have been reserved to the States in spite of the language
of the Constitution, and realizing the almost unrestricted
area now conceded to its action one cannot but recall the
language of Chief Justice Marshall:
"To what purpose are powers limited, and to what purpose

are these limitations committed to writing; if these limits may,
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained?""
42Marbury v. Madison, i Cranch, at p. 69.
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The police power has been fitly called "the law of
necessity." It is the product of judicial alchemy which
in it has found a solution for the great embarrassment which
would have resulted by conceding to constitutional restrictions on governmental power the full force of the language
of those who sought .to express actual limitations, and to

preserve individual rights in fact as well as in theory. But
in so doing, the rights of liberty and property have been

reduced to slender and unsubstantial proportions.

Eternal

vigilance is now, more than ever, the price of liberty.

That

protection which, in the earlier period of our-national history, was furnished by the courts, henceforth must be

looked for in the legislature. Never before in our history
has it been more vital to the individual citizen that legislative bodies, State and National, should be representative
of the best intellect and character of our people.

With a

sense of a responsibility of which the legislature no longer is
relieved by the courts, legislation should be more cautiously
framed, more wisely c6nceived and more justly enacted than
ever before. But the citizen must henceforth be the guard-

ian of his own liberty, for the ancient protection embodied
in the formulae of individual rights, interpreted and enforced

by judicial tribunals, no longer can be depended upon as
barriers against collective wishes or group desires.43
George TV. Wickersham
New York City
"On April 18, while this article was in the hands of the printer, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down its decision in the New York
Emergency Rent Laws case, Marcus Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman (note I,
.supra), and also in the Ball Rent Law case, Block v. Hirsh (note 34, Supra).
Both laws were held constitutional by vote of 5 to 4,'the Chief Justice and Jus.
tices M idKenna, Van Devanterand McReynolds dissenting. Mr. Justice Holmes
delivering the opinion of the Court in the main decision, Block v. Hirsh, laid
special stress upon the emergency feature of the laws, citing as authority the
Adamson Law case, Wilson v. New, 243 U. S. 332. The dissenting opinion
delivered by Mr. justice McKenna is likewise a very able and convincingopinion.
The reader will find it most interesting to compare the views of Mr. Wickersham in this article and those of Mr. Rhoads (in his article commencing on
the next page) as to the proper scope of the Police Power, with the views of
Mr. justice Holmes and Mr. justice McKenna as expressed in their opinions.EDITOR.

